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Public Sociology at its best: A review of Nandini Sundar’s The Burning 
Forest: India’s War in Bastar (Juggernaut Publication, 2016).  
Nandini Sundar’s book couldn’t be timelier. It comes at a moment when the 
biggest threats to basic rights of the most vulnerable, all over the world, are 
from electorally chosen governments. Abundant scholarship has dealt with 
questions of the consequences of authoritarian, despotic, weak, failed and 
fascist states, but this book stands apart. It undertakes one of the most urgent 
tasks sociologists have today — of deconstructing the architecture and 
functioning of democratic states and of exposing its underbelly.  
It is in this analysis of the Indian state, one of the most populous 
democracies in the world, that I think The Burning Forest’s strength lies. The 
work remarkably exemplifies how a functioning democracy lends itself, most 
incontrovertibly, to the project of uncovering the inherent structural 
underpinnings of states and determining their synergy with corporate interests. 
While Sundar’s book only indirectly invokes the mechanisms by which big 
businesses influence the working of states, it certainly makes an extraordinary 
contribution to the study of the enterprise of a state.  
By focusing on Bastar, a small region in central India rich in mineral 
and forest wealth and inhabited by adivasis (indigenous people), Sundar 
creates a microcosm through which it is possible to derive state theories. She 
uses examples of incidents relating to various state machineries in Bastar to 
show the state to be perfectly built and prepared to design, and perpetuate, 
amongst the cruelest civil wars of the century. Unlike a Weberian analysis, 
limited to states’ attempts to reestablish monopoly over violence, Sundar’s 
analysis is a nuanced one. It makes room for diagnosing interstices in state 
compositions which lend themselves to bargaining by various actors, 
especially, but not limited to the interests of capital.  
Inhabited also by the Maoist guerrilla movement, the state in Bastar 
employs one of the oldest known measures of counter-insurgency — turning 
the region inside out. Sundar traces this counter-insurgent strategy, employed 
in Bastar since 2005 and known as ‘strategic helmeting’ or ‘grouping,’ all the 
way back to the colonial Malaya state and the Americans in Vietnam (p17). 
Grouping, most broadly, is the strategy of forcefully displacing local 
populations from villages to government controlled camps. This tactic aims to 
cut off the supply line to guerrilla forces, isolate them and, militarily annihilate 
any resistance.  
How does a democratic state manage to get away with practices that 
were used decades ago by colonial and unpopular states? This is the puzzle 
that Sundar often returns to address. She observes that although insurgencies 
have local characteristics, “[t]he software for counter- insurgency [has] 
remain[ed] the same,” modeling itself on an existing global repertoire (p14). 
The question, then, ought to not be limited to asking if democratic regimes 
change the operations of counterinsurgency, she suggests, but to investigate 
the opportunities that these precise institutions, such as elections, the free 
press, national human rights commissions, and the independent judiciary 
provide — “as cracks through which [Indian] democracy falls — both through 
their institutional weakness and the official legitimation they provide” (p46).  
Sundar’s meticulous research becomes obvious through the book. She 
uses it to describe the mechanisms working in the state’s creation of 
legitimacy for displacing, and then arming, local civilians, making them fight 
their own people under the guise of being a genuine people’s counter-
movement. She shows this operation to be entirely true to the translation of its 
name — a state-initiated and controlled purification hunt (Salwa Judum) 
against dissenting groups.  
She traces, in minute detail, the various arms of the state and their 
concerted effort at keeping alive and shielding the state-sponsored Salwa 
Judum militia. In this unfolds the web of interests that come to occupy regions 
like the conflict zone of Bastar. While minerals and public-private 
partnerships in mining have come to define the century so far (through a 
commodity super cycle leading to their demand) (p29), Sundar also traces the 
interests of rich adivasi politicians from varying political parties in 
combination with a corrupt bureaucracy that make the transfer of indigenous 
lands possible. The economic benefits to the police from being declared a 
guerrilla affected zone, and the aspirations of newly settled immigrants in 
adivasi areas for development (contrasted with the poverty and dehumanized 
image of adivasis), are also tied to motivations for state actions against its own 
people.  
Development itself becomes a weapon of war. While the Salwa Judum 
camp serves as an extreme example, it is easy to find other cases of states 
offering benefits, but with costs attached. Such as, providing employment but 
at the lowest wage rates. In Bastar, Sundar shows how the state withholds 
medical care “as an instrument of war” (p230), at the same time offering but 
closely controlling education — to distance children from resisting villages. 
Government teachers are moved to camps, and not all children choose to 
travel or live there to attend school. Thus, entire villages are left without basic 
amenities. The highest percentage of development funds, instead, quoting the 
economist Kaveri Gill, Sundar shows, are spent on roads (40 per cent), 
presumably a priority for the movement of capital and security forces. These 
facts are used to explain how despite several protective laws for the adivasis, 
they remain the poorest population. Such an analysis can effortlessly be 
transferred to other minority populations around the world, who are protected 
in law, yet ironically continue to remain the most immiserated.     
The justification for quelling adivasi movements and displacing locals, 
Sundar indicates is quite readily accepted by development and progress 
focused state players. A parallel with the acceptance of U.S state intervention 
in other countries under the trope of better conditions and progress, is obvious.  
What does all this mean for resistance? 
 
 
States and movements 
My own work with Maoists in India has shown state counter-insurgency 
measures to be erroneous in their understanding of armed movements. Armed 
movements establish themselves and gain resilience through working closely 
with local communities and building class organizations that are not quelled 
by militaristic solutions, at least not permanently. Armed revolutionary 
movements often manage to build village level structures that are much like 
abeyance structures identified by Mizruchi (1983) and Taylor (1989). They 
may temporarily cease to exist, but the foundations are set for their re-
emergence.   
While Sundar does not condone every Maoist action, even comparing 
several of their actions to the state, she does suggest a rise in their support with 
the strengthening of state counter-insurgency operations (p73). At the same 
time, the state succeeds in its goal of creating insecurity and mistrust among 
entire communities — pitching people against one another. In terms of a state 
analysis, it suggests, how the state also partakes in constructing the 
‘insurgent,’ by turning people they labelled Maoists (to swell their number of 
arrests) to being victims of Maoists (to justify their own killings), depending 
on the need of the situation. However, Sundar leaves unexamined the role of 
capitalists and the many interlocks between business and state as a driving 
force behind these actions; something that would have lent to a more 
comprehensive analysis of democratic states. 
 
Public Sociology 
Nevertheless, this book serves as much a lesson in public sociology as it does 
in state analytics. Sundar closely follows what transpired in village after 
village in Bastar, under the label of counter-insurgency, embedding herself in 
the lives of adivasis at the receiving end — a community she has been writing 
about for the past 26 years. Sundar eventually also turns into one of their 
biggest advocates against the state, filing a public interest litigation (also 
known as public interest law in the U.S) demanding the dismantling of the 
state created Salwa Judum militia. She painstakingly collects information, 
contradicting every account given by the police with what actually occurred 
on the ground. Such evidence is not only necessary to establish the truth, but 
to draw attention to the brutal side of the workings of a state. Sundar describes 
villages she visited in 2005, then again in the following years, up until 2016 
and the conditions they underwent in the two decades — with many villages 
simply being wiped out. This method of employing a longitudinal analysis is 
crucial to any endeavor, such as Sundars’, that aims to identify causal patterns 
in complicated war like situations on the ground.  
Much of the last section of the book discusses the arduous task of 
bringing the state to the book and continues to expose cracks in the structures 
of democratic states. Sundar makes intriguing revelations about the 
interlocking of security and political personnel with policy and judicial bodies; 
mentioning how three of the six chairpersons of the State Human Rights 
Commission were former police officers. The most troubling fact however, is 
her description of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) (p323) in 
investigating the case filed by Sundar et al in the Supreme Court. The fact-
finding committee sent by the NHRC, she writes, consisted of an entire team 
of police personnel — the very force that was implicated in the crimes. The 
team lived with the local police, drew their statements and used SPOs or 
special police officers (cheap temporary foot soldiers for the state consisting 
of young adivasis trapped in state-run camps and employed by the Salwa 
Judum to attack Maoists), as interpreters in the villages. The fact-finding team 
paid no mind to the fact that special police officers had become indispensable 
to the state and police, and were protected from being penalized for the rapes, 
looting and burning of villages they partook in (p198). 
As you cheer for Sundar to win the legal battle against the state, you 
are also reminded of the risks undertaken by sociologists such as her, who 
engage in fighting for the communities they engage with in their research. She 
openly declares her frustrations, tears and exhaustion at taking on the state, all 
while also being a Sociology professor with full time teaching and 
administrative responsibilities.  
Public sociology, much like living in a democratic state, as she shows, 
is steeped in dilemmas. The dilemma in Bastar is this, “People want both the 
Maoists and state, but for different reasons: the former provide freedom from a 
hated bureaucracy and the latter holds out the promise of welfare on a scale 
that no one else can provide. Even as villagers hate the government for what it 
is doing to them, they want justice from this very government. Even as the 
Maoists curse the constitution, they invoke its principles when criticizing the 
extrajudicial killings or the arrest of their leaders. India’s constitutional 
democracy, because of and in spite of all its failures, is a predicament and 
promise that no citizen can escape from” (p45). 
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